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It is widely thought that philosophical behaviorism is an untenable and outdated theory of mind. It is 
generally agreed, in particular, that the view generates a vicious circularity problem. There is a 
standard solution to this problem for functionalism, which utilizes the formulation of Ramsey 
sentences. I will show that this solution is also available for behaviorism if we allow quantification 
over the causal bases of behavioral dispositions. Then I will suggest that behaviorism differs from 
functionalism mainly in its commitment to anti-representationalism, and I will offer two new 
objections to anti-representationalism. The first will be based on considerations concerning the 
contents of desires and intentions. The second objection concerns inner speech and mental imagery. 
We will see that the objections are of relevance to contemporary debates, as they apply with equal 
force to the currently popular anti-representationalist versions of embodied and enactive cognition. 
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The philosophy of mind literature distinguishes between two main types of traditional 
behaviorism: philosophical and psychological behaviorism (also known as analytical and 
methodological behaviorism).1 Both views are usually presented as relics of the past, and the 
implicit message is often that they are still being taught only so that we can learn from their 
failure (Graham, 2019; Heil, 2012; Kim, 2010). It is certainly true that psychological 
behaviorism is widely considered to be hopeless as a general theory of mind, but there are 
some remnants of this view to be found in many areas of empirical psychology. Most 
importantly, it is still often held or implicitly assumed that phenomena that can be explained 
in behavioristic terms should be explained in this way—in particular, they should be 
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explained, if possible, without the ascription of representational mental states. Likewise, it is 
widely agreed that traditional philosophical behaviorism is an untenable theory of mind. But 
the more recent past has seen the emergence of various views that are in line with 
philosophical behaviorism in the sense that they propose accounts of embodied and enactive 
cognition that do not require the ascription of mental representations (Chemero, 2009; Hutto 
and Myin, 2013; Thompson, 2007; van Gelder, 1995; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991). 
My focus here is primarily philosophical behaviorism and its anti-representationalist 
dimension. I will return to psychological behaviorism briefly in the conclusion. 
Philosophical behaviorism faces many objections and challenges. One of these 
objections is commonly singled out as the most devastating problem for the view. This is the 
problem of circularity. I will argue that this problem admits of a relatively straightforward 
solution if we make use of some of the insights that have emerged from the more recent 
debate on the nature of dispositions. If we refer to the causal bases of behavioral dispositions, 
we can solve, as I will argue, the circularity problem in the same way as functionalism does. 
This will force us to get clearer about the difference between behaviorism and functionalism, 
and it will lead us to the second part, in which I present two new objections to philosophical 
behaviorism. The first objection will be based on considerations concerning the contents of 
desires and intentions. In the second objection I argue that behaviorism cannot explain inner 
speech and mental imagery. It will become clear that those objections apply with equal force 
to the currently popular anti-representationalist versions of embodied and enactive cognition, 
and I will suggest that they point to clear limits for neo-behavioristic aspirations in 
psychology and cognitive science. 
Before we turn to philosophical behaviorism, let me add a note on the overall dialectic, 
which may seem rather odd, at first. In the first part I defend behaviorism against the 
circularity objection, and in the second part I reject the view. As indicated, there is reason in 
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this apparent incoherence. The reply to the circularity objection will bring into focus the key 
difference between behaviorism and functionalism. This will take us to my objections, which 
are objections that apply to all forms of anti-representationalism. 
Philosophical Behaviorism And the Circularity Problem 
Let me begin with an outline of traditional philosophical (or analytical) behaviorism 
(henceforth behaviorism, for short). This outline is based on the received view, as it is 
presented in standard textbooks (Graham, 2019; Heil, 2012; Kim, 2010). There are two main 
components of the view. The first is an analytical component that concerns the meaning of 
mental terms. It says, roughly, that statements about mental phenomena can be analyzed in 
terms of (or reduced to) statements about behavior and behavioral dispositions. The second 
component is ontological. It concerns the nature of mental states. It says, again roughly, that 
having certain mental states consists in the possession of behavioral dispositions and their 
manifestations in overt behavior. The analytical component is supposed to yield the 
ontological component: when mental terms are analyzed in behavioristic terms we can see 
that the possession of mental states can be reduced to the possession and manifestation of 
behavioral dispositions. 
To illustrate, let us consider two stock examples. It seems, for instance, that being in 
pain is typically accompanied by certain types of expressions, such as wincing, moaning, and 
by actions that lead to a cessation or alleviation of the pain (avoidance behavior). 
Behaviorism suggests that “being in pain” can be analyzed entirely in terms of such behaviors 
and behavioral dispositions, and that we have therefore no reason to think that the mental state 
of being in pain involves anything else than that. Or, it seems plausible to assume that what 
people believe is strongly correlated with what they are disposed to assert. Behaviorism 
suggests that the mental state type “belief that p” can be analyzed in terms of assertions and 
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dispositions to assert, and that mental states of belief are nothing over and above such 
behaviors and behavioral dispositions. 
At the time when behaviorism was developed and defended, it was commonly thought 
that dispositional properties, including behavioral dispositions, could be analyzed in terms of 
counterfactual conditionals. Behaviorism is still usually presented in this way, even though 
the conditional analysis is now widely rejected (more on this below). Assuming this analysis 
for now, a first approximation to an analysis of belief may take the following form: 
S believes that p if and only if S would assert that p if S were asked about p. 
There are, of course, obvious problems with that. What if the agent does not want to say or is 
afraid to say what is believed? What if the agent intends to express the belief without being 
asked? What if there is some misunderstanding or miscommunication? And so on. 
Note, first, that one cannot avoid those issues by rejecting the conditional analysis. 
Nowadays, the conditional analysis of dispositions is widely rejected, mainly due to various 
counterexamples. Consider, for instance, a sorcerer who would change the intrinsic properties 
of a fragile glass if it were to be struck, so that it would not break when struck. Or suppose 
that the sorcerer would cover the fragile glass with protective coating if it were to be struck, 
so that it would not break when struck. The former is an example of a “finkish” disposition 
(Lewis, 1997), the latter is an example of a “masked disposition” (Johnston, 1992). Such 
examples show that the truth of the relevant counterfactual is not necessary. Reverse cases, 
sometimes called “mimics,” show the opposite. Assume, for instance, that the sorcerer would 
turn a paper cup into a fragile cup whenever it was about to be struck. This appears to be a 
counterexample to the claim that the truth of the relevant counterfactual is sufficient (for more 
on this see Fara, 2005; Manley and Wasserman, 2008). 
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Various lessons can be drawn from this. One may suggest that this shows that 
dispositions cannot be explained reductively, and that it simply has to be accepted as a brute 
fact that dispositions may be finkish or masked in various ways. In light of this, one may 
suggest that behaviorism can appeal to dispositions without analyzing them as conditionals, 
and that there is, therefore, no need to specify all the possible defeating conditions. Given 
this, the proposal may be rendered as follows: 
S believes that p if and only if S is disposed to assert that p when S is asked about p. 
On this suggestion, the mentioned complications are not counterexamples. No claims are 
being made about what the agent would do, but only about what the agent is disposed to do. 
Suppose that, under certain circumstances, the agent does not and would not say what is 
believed. It may nevertheless be true that the agent is disposed to say what is believed (even 
in those circumstances). 
This strategy may help to avoid apparent counterexamples, but it does not get to the 
bottom of the issue. The mentioned complications are not merely potential counterexamples 
to behavioral analyses. Rather, they highlight the fact that the nature of belief is more 
complex than the proposed analyses suggest. Consider the case in which the agent does not 
want to say what is believed. This points not merely to a potential counterexample, but to a 
connection between belief and desire that is essential to the nature of both belief and desire. 
The same holds for other examples. Certain desires may not merely prevent the manifestation 
of a pain, for instance. But the connections between desire and pain are essential to the nature 
of both desire and pain. This means that a rejection of the conditional analysis and 
endorsement of non-reductionism about dispositions does not help here. 
In general, the way in which a mental state is connected to other mental states does not 
only generate potential counterexamples to behavioral analyses, but it is an essential part of 
that mental state’s identity. This takes us to the main problem for philosophical behaviorism: 
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the circularity problem (Chisholm, 1957; Putnam, 1965; see also Heil, 2012, pp. 65–67; Kim, 
2010, pp. 71–78). A satisfactory analysis of pain would have to capture the (actual or 
counterfactual) connection with the belief that pain should be suppressed, the fear that the 
available avoidance behavior would lead to even greater pain, and so on. A satisfactory 
analysis of belief would have to capture the connection with the desire not to say what is 
believed, the intention to say what is believed without being asked, and so on. Any analysis 
that aims to capture the nature of those mental states has to capture those connections. And so 
any such analysis cannot be a purely behavioral analysis, because it would have to make 
reference to other mental terms—in other words, any such analysis would be circular, and 
quite obviously so.2 
As indicated, it is widely agreed that this circularity problem is the most devastating 
problem for philosophical behaviorism. One reason for this is that it is an internal problem 
that seems to show that behaviorism fails in its own terms—it seems to show that behavioral 
analyses are impossible. In the following sections, I will propose a solution to this problem 
for which I need two main ingredients: the solution to the circularity problem for 
functionalism and some more of the insights from the recent debate on the nature of 
dispositions. 
The Solution to the Circularity Problem for Functionalism 
According to standard functionalism, mental state types can be analyzed in terms of 
their functional roles, which are the causal roles that are occupied or realized by the relevant 
 
2 Kim (2010, p. 170) points out that this problem can be construed either as a circularity or as a regress problem. 
There is an indefinite number of external and internal conditions that may prevent the manifestation of any 
mental state. Given this, behaviorism faces a regress problem: any attempt to give a behavioral definition of a 
mental state leads to an open-ended list of more and more qualifications that specify all the relevant external and 
internal conditions. As these qualifications would inevitably include reference to other mental states, this is also 
a circularity problem. The formulation in terms of circularity highlights the more fundamental problem, because 
it shows that the characterization of the nature of any mental state requires reference to other mental states. 
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agent-internal states (Heil, 2012; Kim, 2010; Levin, 2018). It is usually assumed that those 
functional roles include causal connections between sensory input, internal states, and 
behavioral output. To use again the example of pain, one may begin with the suggestion that 
the typical causal input of a pain state is damage to the body, that the typical outputs are 
behaviors such as wincing and moaning, and that the typical connections with other internal 
states include a desire to alleviate the pain and a belief about how to do so. This functionalist 
approach seems to face the circularity problem as well, as it makes explicit reference to other 
mental states. Like behaviorism, functionalism claims to have an explanation of the nature of 
mental states. It allows reference to internal states, and so it must explain why certain internal 
states are mental states. If the characterization of a mental state always requires reference to 
other mental states, functionalism presupposes what it seeks to explain (see Heil, 2012, pp. 
100–101; Kim, 2010, p. 170). Unlike behaviorism, functionalism has a standard solution to 
this circularity problem that is based on the formulation of Ramsey sentences (Lewis, 1972; 
see also Kim, 2010, pp. 170–172; Levin, 2018).3 Here is how this would work for the 
example of pain. Quantifying over three internal states, x1, x2, and x3 (for the pain state, the 
desire, and the belief), we first formulate the functional role of pain (FRP) as follows: 
$x1$x2$x3 (x1 tends to be caused by damage to body, x1 tends to cause wincing and 
moaning, x1 tends to cause x2 and x3).4 
 
3 A Ramsey sentence renders a theoretical proposition free of terms that imply ontological commitments by 
replacing them with variables that are bound by existential quantifiers. For instance, the claim that electrons have 
the properties P and Q has the following Ramsey sentence: there is some x such that x has P and Q; in standard 
logical notation: $x (Px & Qx). This formal method was used by logical positivists in their verificationist project 
to avoid reference to unobservable entities and to separate scientific theories from metaphysics. The details 
concerning their philosophy of science are not relevant here. Lewis (1972) was the first to use this method in 
order to show that mental states can be defined in terms of their functional roles without circularity. For this 
reason, Kim (2010, pp. 170–172) calls this procedure the Ramsey-Lewis method. 
4 For those unfamiliar with logical notation: there are three internal states, x1, x2, and x3, such that x1 tends to be 
caused by damage to body, x1 tends to cause wincing and moaning, x1 tends to cause x2 and x3. 
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Or, for short: 
$x1$x2$x3 FRP (x1, x2, x3). 
The internal state x1 is supposed to occupy the functional role of pain, and we want an 
analysis of what it is for someone, some agent, to be in a pain state. We get this from the 
following sentence for “being in pain,” where now x1, x2, and x3 refer to internal states of the 
agent S: 
S is in pain if and only if $x1$x2$x3 (FRP(x1, x2, x3) & S is in x1). 
Ramsey sentences provide implicit definitions of mental states that make no explicit 
mention of other mental states. They quantify over internal states that are internal mental 
states in virtue of playing or occupying the right functional roles, which are the causal roles 
specified by the Ramsey sentence. This solves the circularity problem for functionalism, and 
it is generally agreed that this solution is not available to behaviorism. Behaviorism rejects 
reference to internal mental states, and so it seems clear that it cannot admit reference to 
internal states that are said to occupy the causal roles of internal mental states. 
Dispositions 
As pointed out, the conditional analysis of dispositions is now widely rejected, mainly 
due to various counterexamples. In response to this, some have proposed revised conditional 
analyses, others have pursued non-reductive and robustly realist approaches to the nature of 
dispositions. For our purposes, the important point here is only that it has become very 
common in this debate to make reference to a disposition’s causal basis. Generally speaking, 
a disposition’s causal basis is an intrinsic property of the object or agent that would interact 
with the stimulus condition so as to bring about the manifestation of the dispositional 
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property. In the case of a fragile glass, for instance, this would be the particular molecular 
structure in virtue of which the glass is fragile. In other words, we can say that the causal 
basis is an intrinsic property that grounds the ascription of the disposition. In what follows, I 
will assume that behavioral dispositions have causal bases: intrinsic properties of the agent 
that ground the ascriptions of the behavioral dispositions in question. 
Before we can turn to the solution to the circularity problem, we need to consider a few 
more clarifications. We assume now that behavioral dispositions have causal bases. Often, it 
is assumed that the causal basis of a disposition is an intrinsic property of the object or agent 
as a whole. Note, though, that it may also be an intrinsic property of one of the object’s or 
agent’s parts. Consider, for instance, a wine glass that has a thick and sturdy base. We say that 
the glass is fragile, as a whole, even if we think that its base is not fragile. Or consider 
someone’s disposition to fall asleep when tired. This is a dispositional property of the person, 
as a whole, but it seems clear that the causal basis of this disposition consists of the intrinsic 
properties of various parts. The physical composition of the person’s toes, for instance, does 
not explain why the person has the disposition, and yet we attribute the disposition to the 
person as a whole. Further, it seems clear that an agent’s internal state just is a property of one 
of the agent’s parts. When we say, for instance, that someone is in a certain neural state we 
mean that a part of the agent’s brain has a certain property (currently or for the time being). 
We can assume, then, that ascriptions of behavioral dispositions are grounded either in 
intrinsic properties of the agent (as a whole) or in intrinsic properties of the agent’s internal 
states (construed as properties of parts). 
Note here that we may attribute a behavioral disposition to the person as a whole even if 
we think that it is grounded in intrinsic properties of some of the agent’s internal states. The 
agent as a whole has the disposition to fall asleep when tired, yet it is clear that the causal 
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basis of this disposition consists of intrinsic properties of some of the agent’s internal states 
(construed as properties of parts). 
Finally, it is important to note that dispositions may interact or interfere with each other 
due to the interaction of their causal bases. Consider, for instance, someone’s disposition to be 
hyper-vigilant and nervous when too much caffeine is consumed. It seems clear that the 
causal basis of this disposition may interact with the causal basis of that person’s disposition 
to fall asleep when tried, so that the former may interfere with (or mask) the manifestation of 
the latter—he may not fall asleep even though he is very tired, because he drank too much 
coffee. Again, we make attributions to the person as a whole, but we assume that those 
attributions are grounded in interactions between internal states (properties of parts). 
The Solution to the Circularity Problem for Behaviorism 
With those components and clarifications in place, we can now see that the circularity 
problem for behaviorism has a straightforward solution. Consider once more the Ramsey 
sentence for “being in pain”: 
S is in pain if and only if $x1$x2$x3 (FRP(x1, x2, x3) & S is in x1). 
Now note that x1, x2, and x3 may refer to intrinsic properties or internal states that are the 
causal bases of behavioral dispositions. As noted in the previous section, behavioral 
dispositions of the agent may be grounded in internal states, construed as properties of parts. 
Given this, we can see that the standard Ramsey sentence solution to the circularity problem 
can be deployed in the service of philosophical behaviorism. 
This may seem too good to be true. At least one would expect an explanation of why 
this has not been noted before. I can suggest the following. An application of the Ramsey 
sentence method requires reference to internal states that can causally interact and interfere 
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with each other. The conditional analysis of dispositions does not enable this. It attributes 
dispositions to the agent as a whole, and it does not include reference to the disposition’s 
causal basis. It does not enable us to see that an agent’s behavioral dispositions may be 
grounded in internal states, and it does not enable us to see how an agent’s behavioral 
dispositions may interact and interfere with each other. Discussions of behaviorism have 
either assumed the conditional analysis or they have ignored questions concerning the nature 
of dispositions. Once we reject the conditional analysis and make reference to causal bases 
that are grounded in internal states, we can see that there is nothing that prevents the 
application of the solution to philosophical behaviorism. 
Behaviorism and Functionalism 
Functionalism is often presented by means of the Ramsey-sentence method. I have just 
argued that the very same Ramsey sentences can be deployed by behaviorism. Does this mean 
that behaviorism collapses into functionalism? Would this not be a reductio of the proposed 
solution? For, clearly, behaviorism and functionalism are distinct theories. 
The application of the Ramsey-sentence method to behaviorism does not collapse the 
view into functionalism. Rather, it helps us to bring the difference between them into sharper 
focus. As we have seen, behaviorism can make reference to internal states, but only if those 
states are the causal bases of behavioral dispositions. Functionalism is not limited by this. 
According to functionalism, the relevant internal states may be, and typically are assumed to 
be, internal mental states, construed as internal states that are the carriers or vehicles of 
representational content. Behaviorism categorically rejects reference to such internal 
representational states. So, the key difference does not concern the reference to internal states. 
As I have argued, reference to internal states does not mark a difference at all. Rather, the 
difference and the disagreement concerns the reference to internal mental representations: 
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functionalism allows and endorses it, behaviorism rejects it. According to behaviorism, 
mental states and contents are to be ascribed to the whole person and in virtue of behavioral 
dispositions of the whole person. It can make reference to internal states only insofar as the 
ascription of behavioral dispositions to the whole person may be grounded in internal states. 
Functionalism, in contrast, ascribes mental states and contents to internal states, construed as 
the internal vehicles of mental representations. 
Two Objections to Behaviorism and Anti-Representationalism 
According to the proposed diagnosis, the key difference between the two views 
concerns mental representation: functionalism is a form of wholehearted representationalism 
and behaviorism takes a decidedly anti-representationalist position. This takes us to the two 
new objections to behaviorism that I will put forward in this section. It will become clear that 
they apply also to current anti-representationalist versions of embodied and enactive 
cognition, as they object to the anti-representationalist dimension of those views—they object 
to anti-representationalism in general. The first objection concerns the contents of desires and 
intentions, the second concerns inner speech and mental imagery. 
The Content of Desires and Intentions 
Approaching this objection, let us first consider the contents of beliefs. At first, it 
seemed relatively straightforward to capture the contents of beliefs in terms of behavioral 
dispositions to assert. The main problem with this suggestion was that we needed to make 
reference to other mental states. Functionalism uses the formulation of Ramey sentences to 
solve this problem. If my argument so far is correct, then behaviorism can use the same 




Can this move be applied to the analysis of desire? Functionalism provides a standard 
analysis of desires in terms of dispositions to pursue goals and beliefs about how to achieve 
those goals. Ramsey sentences can be used to show that one can make reference to beliefs in 
the analysis of desire without circularity, and so desires and beliefs are said to be inter-
definable on this analysis. Given that behaviorism can use the Ramsey-sentence method, it 
may seem that this standard analysis should now be available for behaviorism as well. But 
here we encounter a serious problem for the view. 
Reference to beliefs is often required because we often desire a certain outcome or goal 
rather than the performance of a particular action. In other words, often we do not perform 
actions for their own sake, but in order to bring something about or pursue a certain goal. 
Beliefs provide the necessary information about how to bring about the desired outcome or 
goal. The crucial point is that such desires are directed at outcomes or goals, not at actions (or 
act-types). In such cases, the action is specified by the content of the belief as a means to an 
end, and the desire is not directed at a particular action or type of behavior, but at a future 
outcome or goal. This means that the content of such desires cannot be captured in terms of 
behavioral dispositions. It is, at least, very difficult to see how this could be done. Such 
desires are not directed at particular actions or types of behavior. So how could their content 
be captured in terms of dispositions to perform particular actions or types of behavior? 
Functionalism does not face this problem, because functionalism allows reference to mental 
representations. If we assume that desires are representational mental states, we can construe 
goal-directed desires simply as mental states that represent the outcome or goal in question. 
This points to a serious limitation of behaviorism, in comparison with functionalism. Some 
desires are directed, directly, at actions—we perform some actions for their own sake. But 
most of the things we do, we do in order to bring something else about. You press certain 
keys on your computer in order to write a sentence or browse the internet. You say certain 
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things in order to communicate a certain message. And so on. It seems quite clear that most of 
our desires are directed at abstract outcomes or goals, and it seems that this requires reference 
to the mental representation of outcomes or goals. 
Note that this goes beyond the circularity objection. Now that we can make use of 
Ramsey sentences, the problem is not any more that the analysis of desires requires reference 
to beliefs. Rather, the problem is that the content of most desires is simply too abstract for an 
analysis in terms of behavioral dispositions—it abstracts from the pursuit of particular actions 
to the pursuit of outcomes and goals. This problem becomes even more obvious when we turn 
to the contents of intentions. 
Like some desires, some intentions have concrete or specific contents in the sense that 
they are directed at particular actions (or act-types). Consider, for instance, the intention to 
drink some water (right now), to go out for lunch with a friend, to walk home instead of 
taking the train, and so on. But the contents of many intentions are more abstract and often 
also rather vague. The most obvious examples are provided by intentions to pursue long-term 
plans and projects. Consider, for instance, the intention to learn to play the piano, to move to 
another town, to do a Master’s degree in law, to go on vacation some time in June, and so on. 
Such intentions are not directed at particular actions or types of behavior. At least in the early 
stages of intending and planning, the contents of such intentions are still vague and abstract 
and they are not yet directed at particular actions or types of behavior. Further decision-
making is required before the agent arrives at a plan that specifies which actions to take in the 
pursuit of the goal. 
The problem here is not just that the agent has not yet decided which particular actions 
to take. The problem is that there are no particular types of behavior that could ground the 
ascription of the content—neither now nor later in the planning and decision-making process. 
There is no such thing as the behavioral disposition to move to another town, or to do a 
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Master’s degree in law, because there are no particular types of behavior that correspond to 
those contents. In more technical terms, moving to another town, or doing a Master’s degree 
in law, are not basic actions. One needs to figure out what to do before one can begin to take 
action and before one can be disposed to take action. 
One might think that clusters of behavioral dispositions can provide the basis for the 
ascription of such contents. A cluster of behavioral dispositions would correspond to a cluster 
of particular actions that one intends to take in pursuit of the goal. The problem with this 
suggestion is that, in the early stages, the agent may not have yet any plan or idea about how 
to pursue the goal. At first, the intention may simply be to move to another town, or to do a 
Master’s degree in law. The intention may be formulated at this abstract level only, and it 
seems clear that contents at this abstract level cannot be captured by reference to behavioral 
dispositions. This may seem less clear for cases such as learning to play the piano. But even 
in this case, if one sits down at a piano only with the intention to learn to play, nothing will 
happen. In order to get started, the content of the intention must first be specified in more 
detail—one must develop some plan that specifies concrete actions. 
Note, further, that Ramsey sentences are of no help here. The use of the Ramsey-
sentence method facilitates reference to other mental states such as beliefs. But, in the early 
stages of the planning process, the agent may not yet have acquired any beliefs about what 
actions to take in order to pursue and bring about the intended end. Further deliberation and 
planning may be required before any particular types of behavior come into view, and before 
the agent can form concrete beliefs about how to pursue the goal. Until particular actions 
come into view, there is simply no way in which the contents of such intentions can be 
explained in terms of behavioral dispositions alone. 
We can conclude that desires and intention with abstract contents cannot be analyzed in 
terms of behavioral dispositions. This problem arises for behaviorism, because behaviorism 
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rejects reference to representational mental states. The view’s anti-representationalism is the 
source of the problem, and so it is clear that this is a problem for anti-representationalist 
views in general, including the anti-representationalist versions of embodied and enactive 
cognition. Functionalism, in contrast, does not face this problem, because it makes reference 
to representational mental states. 
Inner Speech and Mental Imagery 
Inner speech and mental imagery are very familiar subjective experiences. Suppose I 
ask you to think about what you did yesterday (without saying anything out loud). Your 
thinking about yesterday will largely consist of inner speech and mental imagery. You will 
probably think of some descriptions of what you did, which are likely to be experienced as 
speech acts that you hear in your head, as it were. And you will probably think of some of the 
things that you did by recalling some of the situations you encountered, most likely by 
generating visual mental imagery. Examples can easily be multiplied. The average person 
spends a considerable amount of time in daydreams or with a mind wandering; and 
daydreaming and mind wandering consist largely of inner speech and mental imagery. 
Deliberation about future actions and plans also seems to consist largely of inner speech and 
mental imagery. 
In general terms, inner speech can be defined, roughly, as the subjective experience of 
language in the absence of overt and audible articulation (Alderson–Day and Fernyhough, 
2015). Mental imagery can be characterized as quasi-perceptual experience: subjective 
experience that resembles perceptual experience but occurs in the absence of the typical 
external stimuli (Thomas, 2014). 
I take it that the reality of inner speech and mental imagery is undeniable. They are 
clearly part of our mental lives, and a general theory of mind must provide the basic resources 
to explain them. It need not give a detailed account, and if it is a philosophical theory it need 
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not give an empirically informed account. But the ontology of a general theory of mind must 
be equipped to accommodate the reality of inner speech and mental imagery. I will argue that 
behaviorism and anti-representationalism are to be rejected because they do not provide the 
basic resources to accommodate inner speech and mental imagery. 
Let us begin with inner speech. How might behaviorism account for it? Philosophical 
behaviorism holds that mental phenomena can be explained in terms of behavioral 
dispositions, and it says that those dispositions need not be manifested in overt behavior. For 
example, consider the proposal that the belief that p can be analyzed in terms of a disposition 
to assert that p in speech acts (in conjunction with further conditions that specify defeating 
conditions). Having the belief consists primarily in the possession of this disposition, and so 
having the belief does not require that it is manifested in overt speech. Can we construe inner 
speech as the manifestation of this disposition in inner speech? The basic idea would be that 
the disposition to assert that p may be manifested either in overt or in inner speech. 
It is difficult to see how we can make sense of this within a behaviorist framework. 
Overt speech is a manifestation in behavior. What could the manifestation of a belief in inner 
speech possibly be? Within the behaviorist ontology, where would the belief manifest when it 
manifests in inner speech? Behaviorism admits only two basic categories: dispositions and 
their manifestations. An inner speech act is not itself a disposition. It is a manifest 
phenomenon: it is event-like in that it occurs. Further, it seems only plausible to construe 
inner speech acts as manifestations, as it seems that they are the manifestations or tokenings 
of beliefs that may also manifest in overt speech. But what does the belief manifest as, when 
it manifests in inner speech? What is the ontological category of the manifestation? 
Obviously, it does not manifest as overt behavior. What else could it be? As far as I can tell, 
behaviorism cannot provide an answer. Behaviorism lacks, fundamentally, the ontological 
resources to accommodate the reality of inner speech. Functionalism, in contrast, provides a 
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straightforward answer: inner speech acts are tokenings of mental representations. 
Representationalism enables the answer. Behaviorism has no answer due to its commitment to 
anti-representationalism. 
The point generalizes to other forms of anti-representationalism. Contemporary versions 
of anti-representationalism, as prominent among the proponents of embodied and enactive 
cognition, often appeal to the notion of re-enactment in their explanations of cognition and 
agency. One may suggest that inner speech acts are the re-enactment (and perhaps 
reconfiguration) of overt speech acts. But this reframing in terms of re-enactment is of no help 
at all. It generates the same obvious problem. What are inner speech acts re-enacted as? What 
is the ontological category of the inner speech act? It is not an overt speech act. What else 
could it be within an anti-representational framework? It is, of course, tempting to say that an 
inner speech act is a re-enactment in the mind. But what does that mean? What that means is 
precisely what is in need of explanation here. According to representationalism, the re-
enactment can be construed as the tokening of an internal mental representation. This answer 
is not available to any version of anti-representationalism. The problem is essentially the 
same as before. The proposal does not provide the resources to accommodate the reality of 
inner speech, and the root of the problem is the commitment to anti-representationalism. 
Mental imagery generates the same problem. To make this as clear as possible, let me 
consider another move that is available to the proponents of anti-representationalism. It has 
been suggested that mental imagery can be construed as the re-enactment (or reconfiguration) 
of direct perception (Degenaar and Myin, 2014). I will not try here to provide an account of 
direct perception—we can leave that to the proponents of embodied and enactive cognition. 
Suffice it to say that direct perception involves the embodied interaction with the object of 
perception rather than the formation of an internal mental representation. 
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The proposal is puzzling. How can direct perception be re-enacted at all? On the face of 
it, it seems that direct perception requires the presence of what is perceived, and so it seems 
that it cannot be re-enacted as direct perception. And if it is not re-enacted as direct 
perception, we need to know what it is re-enacted as. This takes us straight back to the 
problem identified above. It is clear that mental imagery is a manifest phenomenon. Within 
the behaviorist ontology, it would have to be construed as the manifestation of a disposition. 
It is clearly not manifested as overt behavior. What else could it be? Behaviorism has no 
answer to this question. It lacks the ontological resources to accommodate the reality of 
mental imagery. 
As before, the root of the problem is the commitment to anti-representationalism and so 
the problem generalizes. Anti-representationalism cannot accommodate mental imagery 
because it fails, fundamentally, to provide an appropriate ontological category. Concerning 
the appeal to the re-enactment of direct perception, it remains a mystery what the re-
enactment of direct perception is supposed to be re-enacted as. It cannot be overt behavior. It 
cannot itself be direct perception (as the perceptual stimulus is not present). And it cannot be 
the tokening of a mental representation. What type of entity is the re-enactment supposed to 
be? As far as I can tell, anti-representationalism does not and cannot provide an answer. 
To sum this up, inner speech acts and mental imagery are manifest phenomena. Within 
the metaphysical framework of behaviorism, they would have to be construed as 
manifestations of dispositions. They are not manifestations in behavior, and behaviorism has 
no alternative answer as to what those manifestations might be. In particular, behaviorism 
cannot make reference to tokenings of mental representations, which would be an obvious 
candidate answer to the metaphysical question. Essentially the same challenge arises for the 
more recent anti-representationalist proposals. Concerning the suggestion that inner speech 
and mental imagery are to be construed in terms of re-enactment, we need to know the 
 
 20 
metaphysical category of the manifestation. Like behaviorism, recent versions of anti-
representationalism lack the resources to answer the metaphysical question. 
Note that there are two dimensions or components to this objection. First, it is suggested 
that behaviorism and recent variants of anti-representationalism are to be rejected because and 
insofar as they do not provide answers to obvious and fundamental questions. Second, it is 
suggested that an explanation of inner speech and mental imagery requires the ascription of 
mental representations. In other words, inner speech and mental imagery raise a general 
challenge to anti-representationalism because they seem to be “representation-hungry” 
phenomena (Clark and Toribio, 1994). 
Conclusion 
I have argued that, contrary to common opinion, traditional philosophical behaviorism 
does not have a circularity problem. If we borrow the Ramsey-sentence solution from 
functionalism, and if we allow reference to the causal bases of behavioral dispositions, we can 
see that the problem has a surprisingly straightforward solution. This move brought into focus 
the question of what the difference is between behaviorism and functionalism. I suggested 
that the main difference consists not in the reference to internal states, but in the reference to 
internal mental representations: internal states that are assumed to be the vehicles of 
representational content. In the second part, I have argued that this commitment to anti-
representationalism generates fundamental problems. I considered the nature of desire, 
intention, inner speech, and mental imagery to make this point. We have seen, moreover, that 
the same problems arise for anti-representationalism in general, including the forms of anti-




Let me close with a few remarks on psychological behaviorism. I mentioned that one 
behavioristic imperative is still widely accepted in psychology and cognitive science. That is, 
roughly, the imperative to explain as much as possible without the ascription of mental 
representations. Note that this does not have to be construed a behavioristic imperative, 
because it can also be motivated and justified on the ground of ontological parsimony. 
Further, it can be said in favor of this imperative that it encourages a pluralistic approach to 
explanation and to unexplored theoretical and experimental avenues. This seems to be a good 
thing—the more the merrier! However, the presented objections to anti-representationalism 
should put this pluralistic enthusiasm into perspective. It seems that a very great deal of 
human agency is in some way influenced and guided by desires and intentions and by other 
mental states such as inner speech and mental imagery. Indeed, it seems difficult to find clear 
instances of human agency that are altogether isolated from such influence and guidance. I 
granted that some desires and intentions may admit an analysis in behavioristic terms. But I 
have argued that the contents of most desires and intentions will be too abstract or too vague 
to allow a reduction to specific behavioral dispositions. Moreover, even simple and specific 
acts are often constrained by longer-term desires and intentions that are operative in the 
background. Consider, for instance, going for a walk or whistling a tune just because one 
feels like doing so. It may seem that such actions can be explained in terms of simple and 
specific desires. But we usually do not go for a walk or whistle whenever we feel like doing 
so. The execution of such actions tends to be constrained by beliefs and by longer-term 
intentions (such as intentions about how to structure the day or standing beliefs about 
appropriate behavior). The heuristic to pursue non-representationalist explanations has 
delivered some interesting proposals and opened up new possibilities. But it remains to be 
seen how many, if any, types of human agency and cognition can be explained without any 
reference to mental representations (see Schlosser, 2018). I have argued that desires and 
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intentions with abstract contents require the ascription of mental representations, and I have 
argued that the explanation of inner speech and mental imagery does so as well. Given that 
most of our agency is in some way influenced, guided, or constrained by desires and 
intentions with abstract contents, and given that a great deal of cognition involves inner 
speech and mental imagery, the prospects for general anti-representationalist accounts of the 
mind seem rather bleak, and the prospects for anti-representationalist explanations of 
particular capacities appear to be rather limited. 
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